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Spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with volunteering in Newman-Watts small-world networks
Zhi-Xi Wu, Xin-Jian Xu, Yong Chen∗, and Ying-Hai Wang†
Institute of Theoretical Physics, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou Gansu 730000, China
A modified spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with voluntary participation in Newman-Watts small-world net-
works is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent
in the network is a pure strategist and can only take one of three strategies (cooperator, defector, and loner); its
strategical transformation is associated with both the number of strategical states and the magnitude of average
profits, which are adopted and acquired by its coplayers in the previous round of play; a stochastic strategy
mutation is applied when it gets into the trouble of local commons that the agent and its neighbors are in the
same state and get the same average payoffs. In the case of very low temptation to defect, it is found that agents
are willing to participate in the game in typical small-world region and intensive collective oscillations arise in
more random region.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Hc
There has been a long history of studying complex behav-
iors qualitatively of biological, ecological, social and eco-
nomic systems using special game models. After the pris-
oner’s dilemma game (PDG) was first applied by Neumann
and Morgenstern [1] to study economic behavior, great de-
velopments have been made by a lot of subsequent studies.
Recently, more and more attentions have been focused on the
applications of the PDG in the fields of biology [2], economy
[3], ecology [4], and other domains [5]. Game theory and evo-
lutionary theory provide a powerful metaphor for simulating
the interactions of individuals in these systems [6].
Most realistic systems can be regarded as composing of
a large number of individuals with simple local interactions.
For example, human beings are limited in territory and inter-
act more frequently with their neighbors than those far away.
Therefore, the spatial structure may greatly affect their activ-
ities. Since Axelrod [7] suggested ideas of the PDG on a lat-
tice, spatial prisoner’s dilemma games (SPDG) have been ex-
tensively explored in various kinds of network models in the
past few years, including regular lattices [8, 9, 10], random
regular graphs [11], random networks with fixed mean degree
distribution [12], small-world networks [13, 14, 15] and real-
world acquaintance networks [16], etc. In the general SPDG,
each agent can take one of two strategies (or states): cooper-
ator (C) and defector (D). There are four possible combina-
tions: (C, C), (C, D), (D, C) and (D, D), which get payoffs
(r, r), (s, t), (t, s), and (p, p), respectively. The parameters
satisfy the conditions t > r > p > s and 2r > t + s, so that
lead to a so-called dilemma situation where mutual trust and
cooperation is beneficial in a long perspective but egoism and
guile can produce big short-term profit. Agents update their
states by imitating the strategy of the wealthiest among their
neighborhoods in subsequent plays. The system is easy to get
into an absorbing state: all agents are D for large values of t,
which is known as the tragedy of the commons [17].
Recently, Szabo´ et al. [8, 11, 13] developed the SPDG with
voluntary participation, in which agents can take one of three
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possible strategies, cooperator, defector and loner (L). Coop-
erators and defectors are interested in taking part in the game
and the payoffs for their encounters are assigned as before.
Loners do not participate in the game temporarily and get the
same small fixed income σ (σ < r < t) as their neighbors.
Thus the payoff matrix can be tabulated as
C D L
C r s σ
D t p σ
L σ σ σ.
(1)
Each element in the matrix denotes the corresponding payoff
of an agent adopting the strategy of the left and encountering
an agent performing the strategy of the above. In the volun-
teers version, the three strategies can coexist by cyclic domi-
nance (D invades C invades L invades D), which efficiently
avoid the system getting into a frozen state.
In this Brief Report, we study the SPDG with voluntary
participation in the Newman-Watts (NW) network, which is
a typical small-world model constructed as follows: starting
with a two-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions; each agent locates on the lattice and links with its four
nearest neighbors; for every agent, with probability Q, we add
a long range link for each its four links to a random selected
agent from the whole system with duplicate links forbidden;
then a NW network is realized (see Ref. [18] for details). The
structural characteristics of social communities, namely, high
clustering and small diameter, can be well described by this
small-world graph. A round of play consists of the encoun-
ters of all agents with their nearest neighbors. Following Ref.
[14], the payoffs earned by the agents are calculated as aver-
age and not accumulated from round to round. To start the
next round, agents are allowed to inspect the profits collected
by their neighbors and adjust their strategies.
We argue that the ingredients for agents changing their
states mainly come from two aspects: (i) For the sake of pur-
suing higher profits, agents have a trend to follow the success-
ful agents who get higher payoffs, i.e., “successful”strategies
are imitated. We figure that ith agent adopts the strategy of its
arbitrary neighbor j with a probability
γij =
gj∑
k∈Ωi
gk
, (2)
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FIG. 1: The evolution of the density of defectors (ρD) with varied
values of (RTQ, Q) under the equilibrium state: (a) form top to bot-
tom, the curves correspond to (0.02, 0.1), (0.56, 0.1), (0.56, 0.5)
respectively; and (b) (0.02, 0.5).
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FIG. 2: MC data of the density of defectors as a function of the
network’s structure parameter Q under different values of RTQ: 0.02
(a), 0.1 (b), 0.2 (c) and 0.8 (d). Closed squares represent the average
density of defectors; open circles and triangles show their maximal
and minimal values due to oscillation.
where gj denotes the average profit earned by jth agent andΩi
is the community composing of the nearest neighbors of i and
itself; (ii) When one agent and its neighbors are in the same
state and get the same average payoffs, it has a spontaneous
willing to make some mutations. We propose that the agents
getting into the above case make spontaneous alterations with
a probability depending on the elements of the payoff matrix.
If the agent under consideration is C, in the next round, the
probabilities for its changing to C, D, or L are r/(r+ t+ σ),
t/(r + t+ σ), and σ/(r + t+ σ) respectively; if the agent is
D, the probabilities for its changing to C, D, or L are s/(s+
p + σ), p/(s + p + σ), and σ/(s + p + σ) respectively; and
if the agent is L, the probabilities of its changing to C, D,
or L are the same value and equal to 1/3. This spontaneous
mutational mechanism not only efficiently avoids the system
getting into a frozen state but also sufficiently describes the
agents’ flexibility.
Our analysis of the model is based on systematic Monte
Carlo (MC) simulations performed in different NW networks
with the total size of 200× 200 populations. The three strate-
gies are assigned randomly to the agents with probability 1/3
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FIG. 3: MC data of the density of defectors as a function of RTQ
under different values of the network’s structure parameter Q: 0.001
(a), 0.1 (b), 0.5 (c) and 1.0 (d). The symbols as shown in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 4: The density of cooperators (a), defectors (b) and loners
(c) vs the network’s structure parameter Q under different values of
RTQ. The symbols of open squares, closed circles, open triangles,
closed diamonds and open stars correspond to the value of RTQ:
0.02, 0.1, 0.2, 0.56, and 0.8, respectively.
initially. For convenience, following Refs. [10, 11, 14, 15],
we set s = p = 0, r = 1, σ = 0.3, and 1 < t < 2.
We define t − r as the relative temptation quantity (shortly
RTQ) reflecting the extent of the temptation and cursorily par-
tition the networks into three regions: lattice, small-world and
random graphs corresponding to the variational range of Q:
(0.0001, 0.001), (0.001, 0.3) and (0.3, 1) respectively. We it-
erate the rules of the model with parallel updating. The to-
tal sampling times are 5000 MC steps. After appropriate re-
laxation times the system stabilizes in dynamical equilibrium
characterized by their densities of ρC , ρD, ρL and average
payoffs PC , PD , PL. According to the previous assumption,
it is easy to know that PL is always equals to σ. All the results
are averaged over the realizations of ten networks.
The main features of the steady-state phase diagram can be
summarized as follows. All three states coexist and coevolve
31E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.5
(b)
 
 
av
er
ag
e 
pa
yo
ff
Q
  
 
(a)
FIG. 5: Average payoffs of cooperators (a) and defectors (b) vs the
network’s structure parameter Q under different values of RTQ: 0.02,
0.1, 0.2, 0.56, and 0.8. The symbols are the same as shown in Fig.
4, and the dotted line indicates the fixed average payoff of loners.
steadily in equilibrium state. For large values of Q with very
small values of RTQ, strong global oscillations arise, which is
similar to the phenomena studied in Ref. [13] for high tempta-
tion to defect. The bifurcation of ρD for large values of temp-
tation studied in Refs. [11, 13], however, does not arise in our
model. For small values of Q with arbitrary values of RTQ
or large values of RTQ with arbitrary values of Q, the station-
ary state is characterized by a weak global oscillation where
the amplitude of fluctuation is significantly less than the cor-
responding average value. As a distinct view, in Fig. 1, the
last 2000 steps’ evolution of ρD under values of Q (0.1 and
0.5) and RTQ (0.02 and 0.56) has been tracked (the evolution
of ρC and ρL are similar to ρD); the average values of ρD and
the corresponding maximum and minimum deviation in the
steady state are also reported in Fig. 2 for fixed values of RTQ
(0.02, 0.1, 0.2, 0.8)with varied values of Q ∈ (0.0001 ∼ 1.0)
and in Fig. 3 for fixed values of Q (0.001, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0) with
varied values of RTQ ∈ (0.0 ∼ 1.0). These phenomena can
be explained as follows.
During the process of the evolution, defectors can not form
stable large clusters, of which the inner agents would get zero
profit and possess the same state as their neighbors (local
commons). According to the evolutionary rules, they will
try to throw off embarrassment by changing their strategies.
Namely, the easy formation of clusters of D will make the
agents self-adapt frequently in their communities, and then
confine the fluctuation of ρD in a narrow range [see Fig.
1(a), Fig. 2(b), Fig. 2(c), Fig. 2(d), Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b)].
There are two factors favoring the forming of clusters of de-
fectors: the high temptation to defect (large values of RTQ)
and the well clustered structure of the agents (small values of
Q), which would strengthen the adoption and the imitation of
strategy D greatly. Therefore, in our model, high temptation
to defect will only give rise to steady oscillation of the sys-
tem rather than result in the bifurcation phenomena studied in
Refs. [11, 13]. While for poorly clustered agents (large val-
ues of Q) with low temptation, the formation of large clusters
of defectors is reasonably difficult, which would slow down
the evolutionary velocity of the whole system and guarantee
the growth (decline) of ρD lasting for a long time, and con-
sequently broaden the fluctuant amplitude (see Fig. 1(b), Fig.
2(a), Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(d).
In addition, in the lattice region, ρD keeps a steady level
for any values of RTQ [see Fig. 2, Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 4(b)]. It
is also a result of the fast self-adaptation of the agents. With
the increasing of RTQ, agents of C are easy to change to D
for high temptation, and then again change to L because clus-
ters of defectors are extremely unstable and can not survive a
long time. The decrease of ρC nearly results in the increas-
ing of ρL [see Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(c)]. In this region, the
fast self-adaptation of the agents also leads to the case that the
neighbors of defectors would include other types of agents in
most time during the evolution, which gives rise to larger val-
ues of PD than PL. By comparison, in Refs. [11, 13], very big
clusters of defectors can survive a long time during the evo-
lution and most agents would get only the zero payoff result-
ing in lower average payoffs of the defectors than the loners.
It is obvious that the differences in the evolutionary dynam-
ics of the game give rise to the distinct results. It is worth
mentioning that the present model is also different from the
cyclic spatial games studied in Ref. [19] where the dynamics
evolution is governed by a strictly cyclic dominance, i.e., rock
dominates scissors dominates paper dominates rock. While in
our model, any two types of the three strategies can transform
each other in particular case. As a result of the difference in
evolutionary dynamics, the phase transitions phenomena stud-
ied in Ref. [19] for rock-scissors-paper games do not arise in
our model.
Another interesting feature of the equilibrium phase dia-
gram is that in the vicinity of Q = 0.1 where the NW net-
works possess notable small-world effect, namely, large clus-
tering and small diameter at the same time, agents are willing
to participation in the game in the case of very low tempta-
tion to defect. To view in detail, in Fig.4 and Fig.5, we plot
the average density and corresponding average payoffs of C-
D-L vs the small-world parameter Q under different values
of RTQ respectively. For very low temptation to defect (e.g.
RTQ= 0.02), the evolutionary curve of ρL decreases slowly
with the increasing of Q and reaches a minimum at certain
culminating point. As Q increases over this point, ρL ascends
rapidly (see Fig. 4). We conclude that two factors, the very
low temptation to defect and the small-world property of the
network, are beneficial for the spreading of C in the system,
which then stimulates more and more agents to take part in
the game. In the case of more random networks (Q → 1),
the evolutionary results of the game are qualitatively the same
as Refs. [11, 13], i.e., the majority of members in the system
are loners and the values of PC and PD get closed to the fixed
value σ.
In summary, we have studied the SPDG with voluntary par-
ticipation in NW small-world networks. To model the realistic
social systems, some reasonable ingredients are introduced to
the evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the networks is a
pure strategist and can only take one of three strategies (C,
D, L); its strategical transformation is associated with both
the number of strategical states and the magnitude of average
4profits, which are adopted and acquired by its coplayers in the
previous round of play. To model initiative and flexibility, a
stochastic strategy change is applied when the agents get into
the condition of local commons. The agents self-adapt and
self-organize into dynamical equilibrium after a short tran-
sient. When the agents are well structured (the cases of small
values of Q), they can steadily coexist and coevolve. On the
other hand, for high temptation or more random networks,
loners dominate the network. Especially, in the case of very
low temptation to defect, it is found that agents are willing
to participate in the game in typical small-world region and
intensive collective oscillations arise in more random region.
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